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IN THE SUPREME COURI OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
000O000

CHARLES ROBERT BATES,
Case Ho* 14556
P l a i n t i f f and
Respondent,
-v-sGENEVA CAROL BATES,
Defendant and
Appellant•
000O000

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
oooOooo—
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
oooOooo
This action was commenced by an Order to Show Cause
Proceeding whereby the ex-wife sought:
1.

A spelling out of child visitation rights, allowing

the ex-wife to be relieved of a Court Order that she could
not see any of the children, if just one of the children didnot want to see^ or could not visit with her* (75,76, T-110)
asking the Court to set certain times, places and conditions

wherein she could maintain aid further a Mother-child relationship with her children. (76)
2. Payment of past due alimony owed to her in the amoun
of $2,175, owed to the 15 day of February, 1976. (T-107)
The ex-husband!s sole and only defense to non-payment
was that his ex-wife had been honest enough to have informed
him that she was going to be married, and if so^ he would
not be obligated to pay further alimony, but 16 days later
informed him that the contemplated marriage did not take place
(81,82, T-112, T-113)
The ex-husbandfs attorney admitted, "If she in fact has
never remarried, then he does not dispute the alimony being
owed". (T-107)
The ex-tfife has not remarried, and was not re-married
at the time of the hearing.
At no time prior to the Court action was a hearing
brought, or Motion made, to suspend alimony payments. (T-122)
and it is submitted no material circumstances were proven
sufficient, for the Court, without warning, to suspend alimon
and visitations rights vested in the Mother.
The ex-wife, in answer to questions put by Counsel
to her, and Cross-examination by the Court, testified:
-2-

1. That she had not remarried. (T-108 and 109)
2. That she moved from Little America, Wyoming, to
Idaho because her ex-husband, as a truck driver, harrassed
and tried to get her fired. (T-110 and 111)
3. That she resides in a separate side of a house,
with separate entrance, bathroom and bedroom.(T-lll, 112,114)•
4. That she did not share her bedroom with anyone.
(T-lll, 112), and had paid some rent. (T-112)
5. That she was medically hurt, and financially in
bad shape, (T-121)
6. That she was not on welfare. (T-121)
From the foregoing facts, not rebutted, the Court,
at (T-122) says: "Now, when you can show me she is living
under cicrumstances that the children ought to visit her,
and she is not living, I think, in violation of the law
with a man she is not married to—we are not talking about
whether they sleep together or having sexual intercourse
or anything of the kind, We don't need to prove or disprove
that". (T-122, 123)
DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT
The Court, on it's own volition, relieved the exhusband of any responsibility for paying alimony to his ex-3-

wife and denied the ex-wife visitation with the children on
Mother's Day, and reserved further visitation

by the Mother

with the children for the Court to consider in months ahead.
(-122,123, 124,125)
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Setting aside the trial Court's Order, dated the
15 March, 1976, and making such other and further Order
as the Court deems just and equitable under the facts of
this case, awarding the Appellant judgment for alimony due
and owing, allowing her to see her children, and the relief
prayed for in the Order To Show Cause, dated the 23 January
1976- (77, 78)
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT 1:

The decision of the Court and judgment entered

is not supported by the evidence, by Findings of Fact or
Conclusions of Law.
POINT 2:

The decision made modifying the Divorce Decree

was not properly, or timely, before the Court.
POINT 3:

The decision made by the Court denying the Appella

past and future alimony and child visitation rights is not
supported by the evidence, and is also contrary to Utah
Law, the evidence, the past decisions of the Utah Supreme

-4-

Court and Equity.
A R G U M E N T
POINT 1:

The decision of the Court and Judgment entered,

was not supported by the evidence, by Findings of Facts,
or Conclusions of Law.
Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Proceedure provide
that in all actions tried upon facts the Court shall find
the facts specially and state separately its Conclusions
of Law thereon, and direct the entry of the appropriate
Judgment.
The Trial Court found only a finding that the Appellant
had been residing with a man in the State of Idaho for a
period of approximately one (1) year, and that the Appellant
had advised the Court she was not ready to get married at
this time. (85)
The Court made no conclusions that the Appellant did
anything unlawful, did anything immoral or unfit. In fact
the Court makes no other Finding of Fact* makes no Conclusions
of Law whatsoever, summarily on its own does deny Appellant
alimony past due and vested, as well as terminating future
alimony and child visitation rights previously allowed the
Appellant.

In coming to the foregoing decision the Court
-5-

accuses the Appellant of living in violation of the law(T-122)
and at the same time admitting that the Court was not !ltalking
about whether they sleep together or having sexual intercourse, or anything of the kind.

Ue don't need to prove

or disprove that11. (T-122, 123). It is submitted that there
must be something proven beyond what the Court acted on in
this case before the Appellant should forfiet her right to
see her children and receive her alimony.

I assume that if

a woman who vzas divorced rented a spare bedroom to a man rent
the Courts decision would have been the same. To modify a
Divorce Decree as the trial Court has done in this case, ther
must be a substantial change jof circumstances found that will
justify the modification,and the Order of Judgment signed
by the

Court on the 15 day of March, 1976, does not find

as a finding such to be the

case, makes no Conclusions of

Law, but does enter Judgment herein appealed from.

When the

Appellant was granted alimony and child visitation rights,
I do not believe that the Trial Court made as a condition
precedant to receiving such rights that the Appellant could
not reside in a home wherein another human being resided,
in this case a man, especially when the facts are that she
had her own bedroom, own bathroom, was injured, did not
-6-

seek welfare, and was not sleeping with the other occupant
of the house.

I do not believe that the law in Utah has gone

so far as to say that if a divorced woman so nuch as resides
in a boarding house with another human being or should, so
as to not take welfare, should rent a room or even take
in boarders she would forfiet child visitation rights as
well as the great sum of $150 a month alimony from a man
who earned at time of trial the sum of $19,000 a year.(36),
and for whom she gave birth to four (4) children. (8, 14)
POINT 2: The decision made modifying the Divorce Decree
was not properly or timely before the Court.
An examination of the Court record will show that the
only matter before the Court was the Appellants Order to
Show Cause Proceeding, dated the 23 day of January, 1976.(77
Further, the Respondent Mr. Bates never did testify
or give evidence.
However, Respondent did, by his counsel admit that
11

If she, in fact, has never remmarried, then he does not

dispute the alimony being owedTt. (T-107)
Counsel for Appellant pointed out to the Court, lfas
far as I know at this time, I don't think this hearing was
brought or no motion has been made to suspend the alimony
payments."
-7-

The Court5 on its own, without regard to the Appellants
vested right to have judgment for accrued and owing alimony,
without allowing counsel time to prepare therefore, did in
effect restrain the Appellant from seeing her children, and
did in effect say, u go on welfare to live", because for nearly
a year she had received no help from the man she gave four (4)
children.

This without even questioning the Respondent

about

not paying alimony or his actions in denying the Appellant
rights of visitation, or AppellantTs dire financial circumstances, or condition when not receiving alimony from the
Respondent•
POINT 3:

The decision made by the Court denying the Appellant

past and future alimony and child visitation rights is not
supported by the evidence, and is also contrary to Utah Law,
the evidence, the past decisions of the Utah Supreme Court,
and Equity.
In support of the above point 3, as well as Points
1 and 2, the following Utah Cases are cited:
A. Alimony Elements(What

the Trial Court considers wt

granting alimony, and what might be considered a mate}
change thereof to justify modification or termination'
-8-

ANDERSON V . ANDERSON

104Ut 104

FOREMAN V FORMAN

HlUt72

I20ut573

MCDONALD V MC DONALD

PINION VS PINION

92Ufc255

WILSON V WILSON

5Ut279

B. Past due alimony is a vested right and judgment
should be awarded therefore.
MYERS VS MYERS

62Ut90

MARKS V MARKS

98Ut400

OPENSHAW V OPENSHAW

102Ut22
2

LARSON V LARSON

9Ut 160
9Ut2 237

WALLIS V WALLIS

llUt2 218

SMITH V.BRAY
McKay v McKAY

13Ut2 189

SCOTT V SCOTT

19Ut2 267

C. Right of alimony not destroyed by wrong doing.
ALDRICH V ALDRICH

119 Ut 504

CECIL V. CECIL

11 Ut 2 155
2
28 Ut 34
29Ut2 436

KENT y KENT
RING V RING

D. Right to visitation not destroyed by wrong doing,
9 Ut 2 157

SMITH V SMITH
STUBER V STUBER

121 Ut 632
-9-

15 Ut 2 105

DEARDEN V DEARDEN

E. MODIFICATION RESULT OF MATERIAL CHANGE OF
CIRCUMSTANCES.
PETERS V PETERS

15 Ut 2 413

SORENSEN V SORENSEN

20 Ut 2 360

ALLEN V ALLEN

25 Ut 2 87

KING V KING

25 Ut 2 163

FELT V FELT

27 Ut 2 103

F. Modification or Restraing Order need Finding of Fact,
Conclusions of Law to support Judgment.
Rule 52 Utah Rules of Civil Proceedure.
CONCLUSION
Appellant feels that the Court records do not justify
the Order made by the Trial Court on the 20 dayof February,
1976 (85,86), and the testimony elicited by the Court on its
own behalf to satisfy its own personal beliefs without sufficient facts of material wrong doing on the part of the
Appellant does not justify the said Order made on the 20 Feb
ruary,1976. To hold as the Trial Court here held that a
woman should be deprived of the small amount of $150 a month
alimony after years of duty as a wife and mother of four(4)
children, from a husband who earns $19,000 a year is not eqi.
Especially in the absence of sex, wrong doing or unlawful
-10-

acts on the part of Appellant• To justify the Trial Court's
reasoning in this case is to open "Pandora's Box11 to attack
and excuse the obligation to pay alimony, and to deny a
woman the right to visit with her children if she should
be purchased a meal by a man, or even if she resided in the
same building or hotel wheae a man friend may reside. Lastly,
the acts which the Trial Court acted upon were not fairly
before the Court, were not brought before the Court by
either the Appellant or the Respondent, and if either of
the parties had attempted, on their own, to bring the matters
adjudicated by the Court against the Courts wishes, the
Court would have certainly stopped the same, except in this
case the Court did not act as judge, but prosecutor as well.
Perhaps our Court system has come to this, and if it has,
sooner or later the innocent and family's involved by such
actions of the Court in the hands of such a judge, will do
more harm than can be inflicted upon the Appellant in this action*
Further, I cannot help but wonder if the Trial Judge
would have come to the same decisions made in this case if
the Appellant had been re siding, under the same facts*, with
a woman instead of a man. No sleeping together or sex being
involved as the testimony in this case discloses, and the
-11-

trial Judge admits. (T-122, 123). Perhaps then a finding
of fact could be found that she was "Queer1*, and a Conclusion
made that she would be an unfit mother to visit with*
Hardly, however, that she would have to forfiet past due and
future alimony of $150 a month from a man earning $19,000 a
year.
Lastly, I believe this Court put it and called it as
it should be in the case of Anderson v Andeirson (1943) 104 Ul
104; 138 ?

252. "Basis for allowance of "alimony" to wife

is to repay wife for years spent in caring for household
and helping husband in building up husbands property, and
to enable wife to live, or to recompense wife as far as
material recompense will do so, for injuries or abuse to
wife's person or impairment of wifefs health brought on by
husband's conduct during coverture".
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED
Thlss?J?7%
day of July, 19
eorge'^ir S^arle
Attorney for Defendant and
Appellant
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